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In recent years, several measurements of the quality of democracy have been developed (e.g. Democracy Barometer,
Varieties of Democracy Project). These objective measurements focus on institutional and procedural characteristics of
democracy. This article starts from the premise that in order to fully understand the quality of democracy such objective
measurements have to be complemented by subjectivemeasurements based on the perspective of citizens. The aim of the
article is to conceptualize andmeasure the subjective quality of democracy. First, a conceptualization of the subjective qual-
ity of democracy is developed consisting of citizens’ support for three normative models of democracy (electoral, liberal,
and direct democracy). Second, based on the World Values Survey 2005–2007, an instrument measuring these different
dimensions of the subjective quality of democracy is suggested. Third, distributions for different models of democracy
are presented for some European and non-European liberal democracies. They reveal significant differences regarding the
subjective quality of democracies. Fourth, the subjective quality of democracy of these countries is compared with the
objective quality of democracy based on three indices (electoral democracy, liberal democracy and direct popular vote)
developed by the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. Finally, further research questions are discussed.
Keywords
democracy; measuring democracy; models of democracy; political culture; quality of democracy; social science concepts;
subjective quality of democracy; varieties of democracy
Issue
This article is part of the issue “Why Choice Matters: Revisiting and Comparing Measures of Democracy”, edited by Heiko
Giebler (WZB Berlin Social Science Center, Germany), Saskia P. Ruth (German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Ger-
many), and Dag Tanneberg (University of Potsdam, Germany).
© 2018 by the authors; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu-
tion 4.0 International License (CC BY).
1. Introduction
In recent years, several measurements of the qual-
ity of democracy have been developed. Focussing on
political regimes classified as democracies they exam-
ine differences in the quality of these democracies.
These measurements include the Democracy Barometer
(Bühlmann, Merkel, Müller, & Weßels, 2012) and the Va-
rieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project (Coppedge, Lind-
berg, Skaaning, & Teorell, 2016). As thesemeasurements
focus on institutional and procedural characteristics of
democracy, they can be called objective measurements.
This article deals with subjective measurements of
the quality of democracy which are based on the per-
spective of citizens. It starts from the premise that in
order to fully understand the quality of a democracy,
objective measurements have to be complemented by
subjective measurements at the level of the citizens. In
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some cases, the above-mentioned objective measure-
ments use such subjective indicators as well, particu-
larly if objective indicators for theoretical constructs are
missing. For example, the Democracy Barometer uses
citizens’ confidence in the legal system as an indicator
of the quality of the legal system (Merkel et al., 2016,
p. 17). However, this pragmatic strategy is questionable
because objective structures and subjective evaluations
of citizens constitute entirely different dimensions and
can vary independently. It is possible that objective mea-
surements of the democratic structure and processes
are of high quality whereas subjective measurements of
these objects are of low quality and vice versa.
The aim of this article is to propose a conceptual-
ization and measurement of the subjective quality of
democracy. Two assumptions are central. First, the sub-
jective quality of democracy consists of citizens’ sup-
port for normative conceptions of democracy. Accord-
ingly, the more citizens support normative conceptions
of democracy, the higher the subjective quality of a
democracy. We want to point out that the subjective
quality of democracy does not consist of citizens’ eval-
uations of the democracy in their own country which is
a quite common conception (see section 2) but instead
it consists of their basic conceptions of democracy. Our
conceptualization is compatible with a situation where
citizens prefer democracy in general while at the same
time critically evaluate the democracy in their own coun-
try. Klingemann (2014), who introduced the term “criti-
cal citizens” for such individuals, could demonstrate em-
pirically that this type of citizen is widespread in old and
new democracies and that these citizens are inclined
to demand democratic reforms. Hence, the existence of
critical citizens does not indicate low subjective quality of
a democracy but instead is a sign of a living democracy
and of high subjective quality of democracy. Second, in
conceptualizing citizens’ support for normative concep-
tions of democracy we draw on the established notion
of different models of democracy and relate the subjec-
tive quality of democracy to these models. In particu-
lar, we distinguish between three well-established nor-
mative models, i.e. electoral, liberal and direct democ-
racy, which build a hierarchy from less to more demand-
ing models. This hierarchy is taken into account when
conceptualizing the subjective quality of democracy.
The analysis proceeds in four steps. First, the state of
the art on subjective quality of democracy is presented
by discussing recently published studies with compara-
ble goals but differing with respect to the central aspects
of our analysis. Second, after presenting arguments for
why objective measurements of the quality of democ-
racy have to be complemented by subjective measure-
ments at the level of citizens, a conceptualization of the
subjective quality of democracy is developed including
definitions of different dimensions of subjective quality
of democracy. Third, based on the sixth wave of the
World Values Survey (WVS) 2005–2007 an instrument
measuring different dimensions of the subjective qual-
ity of democracy is suggested. Fourth, distributions for
these different dimensions (normative conceptions of
democracy) are presented for some European and non-
European liberal democracies and compared to objec-
tive measurements of the quality of democracy based
on three indices (electoral democracy, liberal democracy
and direct popular vote) developed by the V-DemProject
(Coppedge et al., 2017). In the concluding chapter, fur-
ther research question are discussed.
2. State of the Art
Recently, three studies have been published which are
of relevance for our study on the subjective quality of
democracy. Two studies claim that objective measure-
ments of the quality of democracy have to be comple-
mented by subjective measurements (Mayne & Geissel,
2016; Pickel, Breustedt, & Smolka, 2016) while a third
study develops refined measures of citizens’ attitudes
towards democracy and constructs different models of
democracy on this basis (Ferrín & Kriesi, 2016)
Mayne and Geissel (2016, p. 634) state the goal
of their analysis concisely in the title of their article:
“Putting the Demos back into the Concept of Demo-
cratic Quality”. They argue that the concept of demo-
cratic quality encompasses two dimensions, namely an
institutional opportunity-structure component and a cit-
izen component. While several conceptualizations of the
quality of democracy are available for the institutional di-
mension, conceptualizing the citizen component “which
refers to the ways in which citizens can and do breathe
life into existing institutions opportunities” is a neglected
research topic (Mayne & Geissel, 2016, pp. 635–637).
To grasp the citizen component they develop an ana-
lytic framework and introduce two theoretical dimen-
sions. On one hand, by explicitly referring to the V-Dem
Project they identify three key models of democracy:
minimal-elitism, liberal-pluralism as well as participatory
and deliberative democracy (Mayne & Geissel, 2016, pp.
636–639). On the other hand, they distinguish three key
citizens’ dispositions, namely democratic commitments,
political capacities and political participation (Mayne &
Geissel, 2016, p. 634). For each combination of key mod-
els of democracy and key citizens’ dispositions, they sug-
gest specific attitudes or specificmodes of behaviour cap-
turing the democratic quality of the citizen component
(Mayne & Geissel, 2016, p. 641). For the minimal-elitism
model, for example, they list acceptance of elected elites
as sole decisionmakers and commitment to comply with
law of the land as forms of democratic commitment.
While the proposed attitudes and modes of be-
haviour involve measurable constructs, the authors do
not list concrete indicators from available surveys and
data collections. Furthermore, a definition of the demo-
cratic quality of the citizen component is missing as
well as information on how this variety of attitudes and
modes of behaviour is related to the democratic quality
of the citizen component.
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Pickel et al. (2016, p. 646) initially praise the new in-
dices for measuring the quality of democracy such as
the Democracy Barometer as being innovative achieve-
ments. However, they also criticize these indices for re-
lying mainly on macro indicators and neglecting the mi-
cro level of citizens which might involve a biased per-
spective. Pickel et al. (2016, p. 645) do not start their
analysis with the premise that the inclusion of the citi-
zen perspective is a necessity when measuring the qual-
ity of democracy; instead they ask the precedent ques-
tion “why include the citizens’ perspective?” According
to them, it first has to be demonstrated that the inclusion
of the citizens’ perspective improves the measurement
of the quality of government. To answer this question,
they compare a measurement of the democratic qual-
ity at the macro level with a measurement at the micro
level of citizens. For the macro level, they rely on Democ-
racy Barometer data and for themicro level they use data
on views and evaluations of democracy collected by the
European Social Survey 2012. The measurement instru-
ment of the European Social Survey 2012 asks for several
democratic principles (e.g. protection of rights of minor-
ity groups, equal treatment by the courts) how important
they are for democracy in general (views) and to what ex-
tent these principles apply in their country (evaluations).
Pickel et al. (2016, p. 648) relate the individual level indi-
cators of the European Social Survey to the macro level
concepts of the Democracy Barometer. Their empirical
analysis of 20 European democracies reveal similarities
as well as considerable differences between the macro
level data on the one hand and the views and evaluations
of democracy on the other. Pickel et al. (2016, p. 653)
conclude that citizens views and evaluations “provide
a meaningful complementary perspective to ‘objective’
measures of the quality of democracy”.
By demonstrating empirically that objective and sub-
jective evaluations of the quality of democracy differ, the
study of Pickel et al. (2016) provides evidence for includ-
ing the subjective perspective when measuring quality
of democracy. Their study does not include a definition
of the subjective quality of democracy, but this was not
their leading question. In addition, they do not distin-
guish between normative models of democracy.
The already-mentioned data of the European Social
Survey 2012were analysed in a book edited by Ferrín and
Kriesi (2016). Based on the above-described itembattery,
the authors construct three models of democracy (lib-
eral, social justice and direct democracy) on the level of
views and on the level of evaluations. Although they con-
struct different normative models of democracy, the au-
thors do not address the topic of the subjective quality of
democracy. Themain goal of their book is to develop new
concepts and measurements of political support and po-
litical legitimacy (Ferrín & Kriesi, 2016, pp. 12–13).
The following analysis distinguishes from these three
contributions in several respects. First, a conceptualiza-
tion of the subjective quality of democracy is developed
covering definitions of the different dimensions of the
subjective quality of democracy. Second, the subjective
quality of democracy consists of citizens’ support for
normative models of democracy. It does not refer to
citizens’ evaluations of the democracy in their country.
Third, ameasurement of the subjective quality of democ-
racy is proposed on the basis of theWVS 2005–2007 and
empirical findings are presented for European as well
as non-European democracies. Fourth, these results are
compared to objective measurements of the quality of
democracy developed by the V-Dem Project (Coppedge
et al., 2017).
3. Conceptualizing the Subjective Quality of
Democracy
Before conceptualizing the subjective quality of democ-
racy, we present arguments for why it is reasonable to
complement objective measurements of the quality of
democracy with subjective ones and propose a general
strategy for how to do this.
The starting point is the paradigm of political culture
and its fundamental idea of there being a separation be-
tween an institutional structure and a political culture
(Almond & Verba, 1963). Political culture is based upon
the (aggregated) political attitudes of the citizens and
thus has a subjective basis while the institutional struc-
ture refers to an objective level. The innovative notion of
Almond and Verba is the introduction of the citizen per-
spective into political science and providing arguments
for its significance. Its relevance is expressed in the fol-
lowing postulate of the political culture paradigm: a po-
litical regime is more stable, the stronger the congru-
ency between the institutional structure and the politi-
cal culture (Almond & Verba, 1963, p. 21). In subsequent
research on democratic regimes, the concept of politi-
cal culture has been defined more precisely. Nowadays
it is a widely accepted notion among political scientists
that the stability, as well as the functioning of a democ-
racy, depends mainly on citizens’ support of democracy
(e.g. Diamond, 1999; Easton, 1975; Linz & Stepan, 1996;
Lipset, 1981).
We start from the assumption that this basic postu-
late of the political culture paradigm can be expanded
to the quality of democracy, i.e. support of democracy
is not only of relevance for the stability and the func-
tioning of democracy but also for the quality of democ-
racy. Based on this premise we develop our general strat-
egy of conceptualizing the subjective quality of democ-
racy. In doing so we refer to the concept of support of
democracy. It is very common to distinguish between
at least three levels of support of democracy: commit-
ment to democratic values and principles, support of the
democratic regime of one’s own country, and support
of political authorities (e.g. Dalton, 2004; Fuchs, 2007;
Norris, 2011). These three levels create a hierarchy; the
highest level consists of the commitment to democratic
values—including the value of democracy—and demo-
cratic principles. It is the most important level because
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it determines the support of democracy at the lower lev-
els, specific democratic attitudes, as well as democratic
modes of behaviour. We assume that the commitment
to democratic values and principles is of relevance for
the subjective quality of democracy in at least in three
ways. First, the unambiguous and doubtless support of
democracy implies that citizens do not see any alterna-
tive to this form of government. This can be conceived
as a criterion for the subjective quality of democracy. Sec-
ond, citizens’ basic democratic values and principles are
used for evaluating the democracy of one’s own coun-
try. This confrontation may result in citizens demanding
reforms to improve their democracy which is regarded
as a feature of a vibrant democracy and thus as a crite-
rion for the subjective quality of democracy. Third, the
general commitment to democratic values and princi-
ples influences more specific democratic attitudes and
modes of behaviour. For example, it could motivate citi-
zens to participate actively and cooperatively to both ar-
ticulate their interests, as well as to engage in the politi-
cal decision-making processes (Putnam, 1993). These are
characteristics of a living democracy and of a high quality
of democracy.
To summarize: when interested in the quality of a
democracy, the perspective of citizens has to be taken
into account because citizens are the ultimate sovereign
of democracy. Their attitudes and behaviour depend de-
cisively on their commitment to democratic values and
principles. This is the starting point for conceptualizing
and measuring the subjective quality of a democracy.
The subjective quality of democracy does not refer to cit-
izens’ evaluations of the democracy of their country. The
proposed subjective measurement is not intended to re-
place objective measurements of the quality of democ-
racy but to complement them.
In conceptualizing the subjective quality of democ-
racy we use the “framework for the analysis of data”
developed by Munck and Verkuilen (2002, updated in
Munck, 2009, p. 15) and add some ideas from the anal-
ysis of social science concepts by Goertz (2006). Accord-
ing to Munck (2009, p. 15), the challenge of conceptu-
alization consists of two tasks: the “identification of at-
tributes” used to define the concept, and the “vertical or-
ganization of attributes by level of abstraction”. This ver-
tical organization includes three levels: the highest level
is the concept, the next level comprises the attributes
of the concept, and the lowest level includes the com-
ponents of attributes. These components of attributes
are also called “leaves” and serve as a point of reference
for the measurement (Munck, 2009, p. 21). As a result
a so-called conceptual tree can be developed (Figure 1);
it is comparable to the “three-level concepts” by Goertz
(2006, pp. 50ff.). Munck (2009) illustrates his three-level
model of democracy with objective criteria by referring
mainly to Dahl (1989).
For our purpose, this model has to be specified for
the subjective quality of democracy. Hence, the concept
level consists of the subjective quality (SQ) of democ-
racy (Figure 3). To identify the attributes we draw on
a conclusive notion of the V-Dem Project. Coppedge et
al. (2016) argue that the question regarding the qual-
ity of democracy depends largely on the normative stan-
dards used for evaluation. Accordingly, they distinguish
several models of democracy and suggest a number of
components and indicators for each model with which
the quality of democracy can be assessed. The idea of
the V-Dem Project is to “offer a fairly comprehensive ac-
counting of the concept of democracy as it is employed
today” (Coppedge et al., 2011, p. 253). Consequently,
they use a broad list of models including electoral, lib-
eral, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian democ-
racy (Coppedge et al., 2016). In the following, we pursue
a more simplified conceptual approach and reduce the
list to three established models of democracy: electoral,
liberal and direct democracy. These models are common
both inmacro-level research on objectivemeasurements
of the quality of democracy and in micro-level research
on the support of democracy. For example, such models
have been suggested by Altman (2013), Diamond (1999)
aswell as Ferrín and Kriesi (2016). Using these threemod-
els implies that hybrid models of democracy such as del-
egative democracy (Morlino, 2009; O’Donnell, 1994) are
excluded from the analysis. The advantage of focusing
on these three established models, among other things,
Concept
Aributes
X1 X2 X3
A1 A2 A3
X4 X5 X6
L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L6
Indicators
Components of aributes
(leaves)
C
Figure 1. The logical structure of concepts (based on Munck, 2009).
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Figure 2.Models of democracy (institutions, hierarchical order).
Electoral democracy Liberal democracy Direct democracy
Competitive elections 1 1 1
Liberal rights 0 1 1
Direct participation 0 0 1
Notes: 1 = assignment; 0 = non-assignment.
is parsimony and the possibility of establishing a system-
atic relationship between subjective and objective mea-
surements of the quality of democracy.
In defining these threemodels we rely on concise for-
mulations of the V-Dem Project (Coppedge et al., 2016,
pp. 582–583): electoral democracy “embodies the core
value of making rulers responsive to citizens through
competition for the approval of a broad electorate during
periodic elections”. Liberal democracy “embodies the in-
trinsic value of protecting individual and minority rights
against a potential ‘tyranny of the majority’ and state re-
pression more generally”. Participatory democracy “em-
bodies the values of direct rule and active participa-
tion by citizens in all political processes”. These three
models can be ordered along a normative hierarchy, i.e.
the more demanding models include the less demand-
ing ones (Coppedge et al., 2016; Diamond, 1999). Elec-
toral democracy is above all defined by the institution of
competitive elections; liberal democracy additionally in-
cludes liberal rights, and direct democracy covers forms
of direct participation as well (Figure 2).
Attitudes towards these three models of democracy
constitute the attributes of the subjective quality of
democracy on the second level (Figure 3). In addition
to these attitudes towards the three normative models
of democracy, a basic and generalized attitude towards
democracy is postulated. Only if democracy in general is
clearly supported in the first instance does the question
of support for different normative models of democracy
arise. As a result, the subjective quality of democracy is
defined by four attitudes that create the following nor-
mative hierarchy: democracy (D), electoral democracy
(ED), liberal democracy (LD) and direct democracy (DD).
We started from the assumption that the first and
minimal criterion of the subjective quality of democ-
racy is support of democracy as a form of government
in general. Consequently, the subjective quality (SQ) of
democracy (D) could be defined as follows: independent
of the specific model of democracy institutionalized in
a country, the minimal subjective quality of the coun-
try’s democracy becomes higher, themore citizens unam-
biguously and doubtlessly support democracy as a form
of government.
To judge a country’s subjective quality of democracy
a theoretical criterion is needed that determines themin-
imum percentage of citizens who support democracy. As
a rule of thumb themajority rule can be used; i.e. at least
50% of the citizens have to support democracy.
On a structural level, electoral democracy is defined
by the institutionalization of free, competitive, fair and
frequent elections; this institution unanimously makes
up the indispensable core of democracy (Dahl, 1989; Di-
amond, 1999). On the subjective level, a corresponding
citizens’ attitude towards electoral democracy is support
of important characteristics of the institution of elec-
tions. However, this criterion has to be supplemented by
another because, as we know from autocracy research,
there are many autocracies which hold seemingly demo-
cratic elections (Levitsky & Way, 2010; Schedler, 2006).
Hence, even at this objective level, the institution of elec-
tions does not suffice to separate democracy from au-
tocracy. A similar situation exists on the subjective level
Concept Subjecve Quality (SQ) of Democracy
Aributes
   (Generalized atude
   towards democracy and
   atudes towards
   normave models of
   democracy)
D1…n
Democracy
(D)
Electoral
Democracy
(ED)
Liberal
Democracy
(LD)
Direct
Democracy
(DD)
ED1…n LD1…n DD1…n***
***
Components
   (Atudinal indicators)
Notes: * = Mulplicaon.
Figure 3. Conceptual structure of the subjective quality of democracy.
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when citizens support important characteristics of elec-
tions without showing a clear preference for democracy.
Consequently, support for elections has to be linked to
support of democracy.
Such a link between two attributes is defined by Go-
ertz (2006, pp. 50ff.) as an “AND”-relationship and by
Munck (2009, p. 50) as an “interactive, noncompensat-
ory”-relationship. As a logical expression of this “AND”-
relationship Goertz (2006, p. 61) uses the multiplication
sign “*”. If the absence of an attribute in an “AND”-
relationship is coded as 0, then a multiplication of both
attributes equals also 0, thus the concept does not exist.
Following Goertz, a multiplication sign between democ-
racy (D) and electoral democracy (ED) is included in
Figure 3.
On the basis of the previous argument, a second def-
inition of the subjective quality of democracy (SQ) can
be given which refers to electoral democracy (ED): if an
electoral democracy is fully institutionalized in a country,
the quality of this electoral democracy becomes higher,
as more citizens support democracy as a form of govern-
ment and support the most important characteristics of
electoral democracy.
The first part of this definition points to a further
important characteristic of our conceptualization of the
subjective quality of democracy. It says that assessing the
subjective quality of electoral democracy presupposes
the institutionalisation of an electoral democracy in a
country. The same logic applies to the following models
of liberal democracy and direct democracy. This kind of
reference to the institutional dimension of democracy is
constitutive for the conceptualization of the subjective
quality of democracy. In that way, the paradoxical coex-
istence of there being a high subjective quality of democ-
racy within a non-democratic regime is excluded on the
conceptual level.
Liberal democracy is a more demanding concept; it
presupposes electoral democracy and complements it
by the institutionalization of values which originate from
the tradition of liberal thought. According to many au-
thors (e.g. Dahl, 1989; Diamond, 1999; Merkel, 2004), a
liberal democracy is the only type of democracy which
sufficiently corresponds to the meaning of democracy.
In order to be meaningful, elections need to be comple-
mented by the guarantee of political rights and civil lib-
erties. The third dimension of the subjective quality of
democracy (SQ) referring to liberal democracy (LD) can
be defined as follows: if a liberal democracy is fully in-
stitutionalized in a country, then the quality of this lib-
eral democracy is higher, the more citizens are in favour
of electoral democracy while simultaneously supporting
the most important characteristics of liberal democracy.
The “AND”-relationship between the subjective quality
of electoral democracy and liberal democracy is marked
by a multiplication sign in Figure 3.
Direct democracy is characterized by direct partic-
ipation of citizens in political decisions. Historically, a
pure form of direct democracy only existed within the
city-state of the ancient Athens, where all important
issues were decided by the people themselves, and
the people literally governed themselves. In contempo-
rary nation-states, organized as representative democ-
racy, the model of direct democracy consists of the
supplementation of representative democracy by forms
of direct citizen participation such as referendums (Alt-
man, 2011).
In defining the subjective quality of direct democracy
a conceptual problem arises. To what extent do forms of
direct participation have to be institutionalized so that
we are able to refer to them as a new type of democ-
racy which can be called direct democracy? Creating a
threshold is difficult. However, the notion of supplement-
ing representative democracy with forms of direct citi-
zen participation involves the idea of a continuum with
a purely representative democracy at one end and a rep-
resentative democracy which incorporates some degree
of direct participation at the other end. Usually, Switzer-
land with by far the most forms of direct participation is
placed at the end of this continuum.
The ambiguity of the concept of direct democracy
has also consequences for the definition of the subjec-
tive quality of this model. In contrast to electoral democ-
racy and liberal democracy, it cannot start from the
premise that direct democracy is fully institutionalized.
This is why the definition of the subjective quality (SQ)
of direct democracy (DD) has to take into account differ-
ent degrees of direct participation: provided that a lib-
eral democracy has institutionalized some forms of di-
rect participation and therefore can be understood as a
direct democracy, then the subjective quality of the di-
rect democracy is higher, the stronger citizen support for
these forms of direct participation is. Again, the “AND”-
relationship between the subjective quality of liberal
democracy and direct democracy is marked by a multi-
plication sign in Figure 3.
The construction of an “AND”-relationship between
the subjective quality of the three models of democ-
racy is the technical implementation of the assumption
that the three models form a normative hierarchy, i.e.
the more demanding models include the less demand-
ing ones (cf. Figure 2). At the objective level, the V-Dem
Project constructs the indices for the different models in
a similar way (Coppedge et al., 2016, 2017).
The next and lowest level of the conceptual tree is
made up of components of attributes. In the concep-
tual structure in Figure 3, these refer to the attitudi-
nal indicators of the attributes and are addressed in the
next section.
4. Measuring the Subjective Quality of Democracy
For themeasurement of the subjective quality of democ-
racy, survey data are required asking for support of
democracy in general and support of the electoral, lib-
eral, and direct model of democracy. Currently, only two
comparative representative surveys including such indi-
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cators are available: the European Social Survey 2012
covering only European countries and the WVS includ-
ing European as well as non-European countries. In or-
der to be able to include non-European countries as well,
we draw on the sixth wave of theWVS (2005–2007). The
indicators and the construction of the corresponding in-
dices “Democracy (D)”, “Electoral Democracy (ED)”, “Lib-
eral Democracy (LD)”, and “Direct Democracy (DD)” are
described in Table 1.
The different models of democracy represent norma-
tive models, therefore each indicator assigned to each
construct constitutes a necessary feature of the respec-
tive model. In order to construct the four indices, each
indicator measuring support of democracy or demo-
cratic principles is dichotomized. Respondents who sup-
port democracy in general or electoral democracy or lib-
eral democracy or direct democracy are coded 1; those
who do not support democracy or electoral democracy
or liberal democracy or direct democracy are coded 0.
Through the multiplication of two measurements one
gets a 0 if any one of the measurements is 0; in this case,
the respective democratic attitude does not exist.
For constructing the index “Democracy (D)” an indi-
cator is available which directly asks whether a demo-
cratic political system is good or bad. Yet, as respondents
may associate different things with democracy, a correct
understanding of democracy which at least roughly cor-
responds with the theoretical definition cannot be as-
sumed. However, the understanding can be checked us-
ing two indicators which unequivocally measure a rejec-
tion of autocracy. One indicator asks whether one con-
siders a “strong leader who does not have to bother with
parliament and elections” to be good or bad; the other
asks the same for “having the army rule”. Initially the
three indicators, measured on a four-point scale, are di-
chotomized separating between good and bad. Respon-
dents who support democracy in general are coded 1,
those who do not support democracy are coded 0. In or-
der to correct for a reasonable understanding of democ-
racy, the multiplication rule is applied. If a respondent
assesses at least one of the two autocracy items as good,
0 is assigned; the multiplication with support of democ-
racy results in 0, which means that the respondent does
not support democracy unambiguously and doubtlessly.
Table 1.Measuring the subjective quality of democracy on the basis of the WVS 2005–2007.
Quality dimension Original Items Measurement
Democracy (D) • Having a democratic political system • All three variables are dichotomized (1–2 = 1; 3–4 = 0).
• Having a strong leader who does • Construction of index “rejection of autocracy”: 1 = if
• not have to bother with parliament • “strong leader” equal 0 or “army rule” equal 0; 0 = all
• and elections? • other logical combinations
• Having the army rule • Construction of index “Democracy (D)” = democratic
• (1 = very good, 2 = fairly good, • system * index “rejection of autocracy”
• 3 = fairly bad, 4 = very bad) • (1 = “democratic system” equal 1 * “rejection of
• autocracy” equal 1; 0 = all other multiplicative terms)
Electoral • People choose their leaders in free • Both variables are dichotomized (1–7 = 0; 8–10 = 1).
Democracy (ED) • elections • Construction of index “elections”: 1 = if “free elections”
• Women have the same rights as • equal 1 and “same rights” equal 1; 0 = all other logical
• men (1 = not an essential • combinations
• characteristic democracy…10 = an • Construction of index “Electoral Democracy (ED)”
• essential of characteristic of • = index “elections” * index “Democracy (D)”
• democracy) • (1 = “elections” equal 1 * index “Democracy (D)”
• equal 1; 0 = all other multiplicative terms)
Liberal • Civil rights protect people’s liberty • Variable “civil rights” is dichotomized (1–7 = 0;
Democracy (LD) • against oppression. • 8–10 = 1).
• (1 = not an essential characteristic • Construction of index “Liberal Democracy (LD)” =
• of democracy…10 = an essential • variable “civil rights” * index “Electoral Democracy (ED)”
• characteristic of democracy) • (1 = “civil rights” equal 1 * index “Electoral Democracy
• (ED)” equal 1; 0 = all other multiplicative terms)
Direct • People can change the laws in • Variable “referendums” is dichotomized (1–7 = 0;
Democracy (DD) • referendums. (1 = not an essential • 8–10 = 1).
• characteristic of democracy…10 = • Construction of index “Direct Democracy (DD)”
• an essential characteristic • = variable “referendums” * index “Liberal Democracy
• of democracy) • (LD)” (1 = “referendums” equal 1 * index “Liberal
• Democracy (LD)” equal 1; 0 = all other multiplicative
• terms)
Notes: * =Multiplication.
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For measuring the support of electoral, liberal, and
direct democracy an item battery covering several prin-
ciples of democracy (e.g. people choose their leaders in
free elections) is used. The respondents are asked for
each whether it is an essential characteristic of democ-
racy or not. The scale ranges from 1 (= not an essential
characteristic of democracy) to 10 (= an essential charac-
teristic of democracy). In order to measure clear support
of a democratic principle and to avoid a soft middle cat-
egory, the scale is dichotomized as follows: The values
8–10 are coded 1 and the remaining values are coded 0.
Of course, other modes of dichotomizing would produce
different results.
Support of electoral democracy is measured by two
indicators: “people choose their leaders in free elections”
and “women have the same rights as men”. They refer
to two basic principles of electoral democracy, namely
free elections and political equality. The second indica-
tor “women have the same rights as men” is ambigu-
ous because the protection of women’s rights can also
be regarded as a criterion for a liberal democracy. But
since, according to Dahl (1989), elections are not suffi-
ciently defined without the criterion of equality, this in-
dicator is used as a proxy for the equality criterion. Only
if both of these principles, i.e. free elections and politi-
cal equality, are considered to be essential characteris-
tics of democracy, can reasonable support of electoral
democracy be assumed. In order to construct the index
“Electoral democracy (ED)” the multiplication rule with
“Democracy (D)” is applied.
The indicator measuring liberal democracy repre-
sents an appropriate operationalization of a basic princi-
ple of negative liberties: “civil rights protect people’s lib-
erty against oppression”. Finally, the indicator for direct
democracy focuses on a central form of direct participa-
tion of the citizens: “People can change the laws in refer-
endums”. Referendums are the dominant form in which
direct democracy can be realized inmodern democracies.
For constructing the respective indices, “Liberal Democ-
racy (LD)” and “Direct Democracy (DD)”, the values are
multiplied by the preceding models.
As the item battery of the WVS asks whether each
element is an essential characteristic of democracy it
might be criticized for measuring primarily a cognitive
and not the conceptually demanded evaluative dimen-
sion. In the first instance, we would argue that the crite-
rion “essential” includes more of an evaluative compo-
nent than the criterion “important” used by the compa-
rable battery of the European Social Survey 2012. At any
rate, it is plausible to assume that the specific character-
istics of democracy gathered by the WVS clearly has an
evaluative meaning, if democracy is unambiguously pre-
ferred as a form of government (see multiplication with
“Democracy (D)” in Table 1).
5. Empirical Results
To demonstrate the applicability of the proposed mea-
sure of the subjective quality of democracy and to com-
pare it with an objective measure a sample of five Eu-
ropean and five non-European liberal democracies was
selected (France, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Switzer-
land vs. Brazil, India, South Korea, Taiwan, USA). Liberal
democracies were identified on the basis of the liberal
democracy index of V-Dem (Coppedge et al., 2017). The
scale of this index ranging from 0 to 1; we define that
values greater than 0.5 indicate the existence of a liberal
democracy. This definition is validated by the democracy
index of Freedom House (2017); all selected countries
are classified as liberal democracies by this index, too.
Table 2 includes the distribution of the four indices
measuring the subjective quality of democracy (columns
“subjective”) as well as data for the objective quality
of democracy for each of the three normative models
(columns “objective”). The objective data was provided
by V-Dem (Coppedge et al., 2017). The values for the
three indices—electoral democracy index, liberal democ-
racy index, direct popular vote index—vary from 0 to 1.
Table 2. Subjective and objective quality of democracy in selected liberal democracies.
Democracy (D) Electoral Democracy (ED) Liberal Democracy (LD) Direct Democracy (DD)
Country Subjective Subjective Objective 1 Subjective Objective 2 Subjective Objective 3
Norway 81.7 74.2 0.92 57.5 0.89 44.0 0.31
Switzerland 79.8 70.8 0.91 64.8 0.87 62.2 0.68
Sweden 79.7 79.8 0.91 75.0 0.88 57.8 0.15
Germany 78.4 67.7 0.91 63.0 0.88 54.7 0.01
USA 59.1 49.9 0.87 44.3 0.81 34.4 0.11
France 57.6 43.3 0.91 37.1 0.83 28.9 0.11
South Korea 39.3 27.3 0.84 21.8 0.76 17.0 0.03
Taiwan 37.0 30.6 0.77 27.6 0.68 22.8 0.21
Brazil 27.3 20.7 0.89 15.5 0.78 13.7 0.21
India 27.3 19.4 0.73 16.9 0.58 12.1 0.11
Notes: 1 Electoral democracy index (V-Dem, 2005); 2 Liberal democracy index (V-Dem, 2005), 3 Direct popular vote index (V-Dem, 2005).
Database: WVS 2005–2007.
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The higher the value, the more the democracy of each
country conforms to the normativemodel and the higher
the objective quality of that democracy. We start with
the description of the subjective data and then move on
to the objective data.
As the subjective democracy indices are constructed
in such a way that the more demanding models pre-
suppose the less demanding ones, the level of subjec-
tive quality of democracy successively decreases from
“Democracy (D)” to “Direct Democracy (DD)”. In Table 2,
the countries are ordered according to the level of sup-
port for “Democracy (D)”.
The most striking feature of the distribution of the
subjective quality of democracy is the significant differ-
ences between the countries. This is already true for the
basic support of democracy as a form of government,
i.e. “Democracy (D)”. The minimal subjective quality of
democracy is the highest in Norway (81.7%) and the low-
est in India and Brazil (27.3%). Notably, the values of
all established Western countries, i.e. the five European
countries and the USA, are above the 50-percent-level,
while the values of the remaining non-European coun-
tries are below.
The pattern is similar for “Electoral Democracy (ED)”,
where Norway shows the highest (74.2%) and India
(19.4%) the lowest degree of subjective quality. Even
though all countries are classified as liberal democracies,
the data for the subjective quality of “Liberal Democracy
(LD)” reveal considerable differences. Only four Euro-
pean countries (Norway, Switzerland, Sweden, and Ger-
many) exceed the 50-percent-level and with the excep-
tion of the USA, all non-European countries reveal sup-
port levels below 30%.
Country differences are also large for the subjective
quality of “Direct Democracy (DD)”. The lowest figures
can be found in India (12.1%) and the highest level of sub-
jective quality of direct democracy is—as expected—in
Switzerland (62.2%). Interestingly, the values for Sweden
and Germany are also above the 50-percent-level. Over-
all, the established Western democracies show higher
values than the other non-Western countries and the
differences within the first group of countries are much
higher than in the second group.While in the established
Western democracies values range from 28.9% (France)
to 62.2% (Switzerland), support for direct democracy in
the other non-Western countries varies only from 12.1%
(India) to 22.8% (Taiwan). Obviously, it is difficult to in-
terpret the pattern for the subjective quality of direct
democracy without objective data on the degree of in-
stitutionalization of direct democracy.
As an initial conclusion, we can state that the data re-
veal significant differences regarding the subjective qual-
ity of all threemodels of democracy. The lowest levels ex-
ist for non-Western democracies. Applying less strict cri-
teria in dichotomizing the indicators would indeed result
in higher percentages for the subjective quality of democ-
racy but the substantial differences between the coun-
tries as well as the ranking of countries would remain.
What about the objective quality of democracy in
the selected European and non-European countries? For
electoral and liberal democracy, the differences between
the countries at the objective level are considerably
lower compared to the subjective level. For electoral
democracy, only the figures of Taiwan and India are be-
low 0.80. The liberal democracy index reveals two thresh-
olds, one which separates Western from non-Western
countries (above and below 0.80, respectively) and the
other within the non-Western countries where India
clearly differs from the rest (below 0.68).
In order to measure the objective quality of direct
democracy we do not draw on the very broadly defined
participatory democracy index of V-Dem; instead, the di-
rect popular vote index is used (Coppedge et al., 2017,
pp. 52–53, 62–63). It corresponds to the subjective indica-
tor asking for approval of referendums. The most striking
result for this objectivemeasurement is that only Switzer-
land has a notable value (0.68). This reflects the fact that
in other countries direct democracy or referendums are
not or are hardly institutionalized. However, it is notewor-
thy that despite the low degree of institutionalization of
direct democracy, the subjective quality score is between
44 and 57.8% in several countries (Norway, Sweden, and
Germany). This can be interpreted as citizens’ demand for
the introduction of referendums into the institutional set-
ting of the liberal democracy of their country.
The most important result of the comparison be-
tween objective and subjective measures of the quality
of democracy is the following: differences between coun-
tries at the objective level are considerably lower than
at the subjective level. This implies different things for
the various models of democracy. First, with respect to
electoral and liberal democracy, this can mean, among
other things, that even a successful institutionalization
of an electoral or liberal democracy in a country does
not, at the same time, ensure a corresponding level of cit-
izens’ commitment to democratic values and principles.
Such a configuration is already known from democrati-
zation research, where democratic consolidation encom-
passes not only the existence of democratic institutions
but also support of democracy by the main political ac-
tors (Diamond, 1999; Linz & Stepan, 1996). A commit-
ment to democratic values and principles depends on dif-
ferent historical traditions and different cultural contexts
(Fuchs & Roller, 2016), it cannot be directly generated
by implementing democratic institutions. Second, with
respect to direct democracy, a reverse pattern exists be-
tween the subjective and objective quality of democracy.
The discrepancy between both dimensions can mean
that citizens demand that the institutional setting of lib-
eral democracy in their country is complemented with
instruments of direct democracy.
6. Conclusions
The aim of the article is to contribute to the current dis-
cussion on assessing the quality of democracy in several
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ways. First, by arguing that a measurement of the subjec-
tive quality of democracy is reasonable. We start from
the assumption that the basic postulate of the concept
of political culture, according towhich support of democ-
racy is of relevance for the stability and functioning of a
democracy, can be expanded to the subjective quality of
democracy as well. Second, by conceptualizing the sub-
jective quality of democracy as support for differentmod-
els of democracy (distinguishing between three estab-
lished normative models, i.e. electoral, liberal and direct
democracy) and not as citizens’ evaluation of democracy
in their country. Accordingly, the more citizens support
normative conceptions of democracy, the higher the sub-
jective quality of a democracy. Third, by developing an
instrument measuring the suggested dimensions of the
quality of democracy for European and non-European
democracies. Fourth, by demonstrating the applicability
of this instrument and providing initial empirical results.
Fifth, by comparing these resultswith objectivemeasure-
ments provided by V-Dem. The comparison of the sub-
jective with the objective quality of democracy for the
electoral, liberal and direct models of democracy shows
that at the objective level the differences between the
countries are significantly lower than those at the subjec-
tive level. Hence, the subjective perspective of citizens
is not fully determined by the objective institutions and
processes. For the subjective perspective, historical tra-
ditions and cultural contexts play a crucial role.
The proposedmeasurement for assessing the subjec-
tive quality of democracy is preliminary, it is not claimed
to be the final solution. For future research, at least three
desiderata remain. First, the validity of ourmeasurement
instrument should be examined usingmultiple indicators
for eachmodel of democracy. This could be done, at least
for European countries, on the basis of the European So-
cial Survey 2012 which includes several indicators for the
different models of democracy. Second, supplementing
the subjective quality of democracy by including support
for normative conceptions of democratic community, i.e.
the relationship between citizens such as tolerance to-
ward other groups and trust in unknown others. Empir-
ically, it could be demonstrated that the largest differ-
ences between Western and non-Western countries ex-
ist for these normative conceptions of democratic com-
munity (Fuchs & Roller, 2016). Third, a measurement in-
strument could be developed to combine the objective
and subjective dimensions of quality of democracy.
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